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COMMENT ON

STATE V. PORTER
By Jane Norris

Imagine this: You, a public defender, are about to participate in voir dire after weeks of trial preparation.1 Your client,
a Black woman, is accused of resisting arrest and aggravated assault of a police officer. You’ve read the studies on
how racial discrimination is prevalent in jury selection.2 You are aware of how the racial makeup of a jury affects
sentencing.3 After asking your curated questions to the jury panel, you believe you know which jurors are going to
hurt your client. After both you and the prosecutor have struck jurors for cause, the prosecutor uses peremptory
challenges to strike the only prospective Black jurors.4 Believing that the prosecutor is operating on discriminatory
grounds, you immediately raise a Batson challenge—an objection to a peremptory challenge—on the grounds that
the opposing party used the peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race, ethnicity or sex.5
In response, the prosecutor offers a few
explanations for striking the Black jurors. He
states that the first struck juror’s brother
had a criminal history, and that juror had an
uncertain demeanor when they described
their ability to remain impartial.6 He defends
his second peremptory challenge by bringing
up the juror’s history with the court.7 You
respond by pointing to the court transcript,
where the first struck Black juror said that
she was confident that she would be able to
be an impartial juror. Despite this, the judge
finds the prosecutor’s proffered reasons
reasonable and race-neutral and allows
the strikes. The all-white jury convicts your
client of resisting arrest.8 You are confident
that if the jury had been representative of
the racial makeup of the court’s jurisdiction,
your client would have been found not
guilty.9
These are the facts of State v. Porter, a case
that was appealed to the Arizona Supreme
Court on July 22, 2021.10 Unfortunately, this
case demonstrates the many issues with
Batson challenges.
The Batson challenge originated in the
Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky, and
involves three steps.11 First, the objecting
party makes a prima facie case of the
striking party’s intentional discrimination.12
Then, the striking party articulates a
racially neutral explanation for why it

struck a particular potential juror.13 These
explanations may be based on the juror’s
background, education or other experiencebased reasons. These explanations may also
be based on the potential juror’s external
demeanor, such as uncertainty.14 When
demeanor-based reasons are accepted by
the trial court, appellate courts give these
findings high deference because demeanors
cannot be recorded in a transcript, and
therefore, are very difficult to review.15 After
the striking party proffers their explanations,
the objecting party is given an opportunity
to prove that the striking party’s proffered
neutral reason is pretext for discrimination.16
The court will then determine if the striking
party had discriminatory intent, meaning
purposeful discrimination.17 In making this
determination, the court must “undertake
‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.’”18
While Porter questions the validity of a
Batson challenge, the Arizona Supreme
Court relied heavily upon Snyder v. Louisiana,
a U.S. Supreme Court case. In Snyder, the
plaintiff raised a Batson challenge after the
prosecution used peremptory strikes against
the only prospective Black jurors, one of whom
was a student.19 In response, the prosecution
offered two race-neutral reasons for the
strike against the student: (1) the juror looked
nervous throughout the questioning; and
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(2) the juror may be tempted to give a lower
sentence to shorten trial to quickly return
to educational obligations.20 The trial court
made no express findings on the “nervous”
demeanor, but it did expressly accept the
second proffered explanation as valid.21
In its analysis regarding a lack of express
finding, the Supreme Court reasoned that,
“it is possible that the [trial] judge did
not have any impression one way or the
other concerning [the juror]’s demeanor….
we cannot presume that the trial judge
credited the prosecutor’s assertion that
[the prosecutor] was nervous.”22 The Court
reasoned that this understanding was
necessary for cases in which the trial judge
may have been unable to make such a
determination because of circumstantial
reasons, such as the memory of the
judge, the amount of time in between the
challenge and the interview, etc.23 However,
the Supreme Court found the non-demeanor
reason given by the prosecutor in Snyder to
be pretextual, and without evidence of the
demeanor based reason to consider, ordered
a new trial.24 The Arizona Supreme Court
relied on this holding in Porter, and stated
that the lack of express finding on the
uncertainty of the juror was inconsequential:
the non-demeanor based justification was
found not to be pretextual.25 By falling in
line with Snyder, Porter fails to give minority
defendants a chance at a fair trial.

Under Snyder, if the trial judge only makes express findings on the
proffered reason that is found neutral, then it is inconsequential
if the other demeanor-based reason, with no express findings, is
discriminatory. The appellate court can only rely on express findings
by the trial court in evaluating demeanor-based justifications, as
there is no evidence for the appellate court to review regarding
demeanor-based justifications. If the court is not required to make
express findings, then it allows the trial court the option to decide
if demeanor-based reasoning can be reviewed. A requirement for
trial courts to make express findings is desperately needed, as
Batson jurisprudence only requires the consideration of the parties’
explanations and arguments.

The impracticability of the Batson challenge has led states to adopt
court rules that allow for easier prevention of racial and gender bias
on juries. In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court adopted General
Rule 37 (“GR 37”).36 This rule expanded the prohibition against using
race-based peremptory challenges during jury selection to include
instances that an “object observer” could view race or ethnicity
as a factor in the use of the peremptory strike, such as the juror’s
demeanor, inattentiveness, failure to make eye contact or exhibited a
problematic attitude.37 The rule also finds having prior contact with law
enforcement officers, expressing a distrust of law enforcement, having
a child outside of marriage and living in a high-crime neighborhood
presumptively invalid reasons for a peremptory challenge.38

Nevertheless, even if trial judges always made express findings, their
findings would likely still be deferred to by appellate court, as “a trial
court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained
unless it is clearly erroneous.”26 This is due to the unique position of
the trial court has in evaluating Batson claims, as step three of the
Batson inquiry, “involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility…
and ‘the best evidence of [discriminatory intent] often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”27

Similarly, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 3070 (“AB
3070”) in August of 2020.39 While it has similar language to GR 37, it
differs in its inclusion of gender, gender identity, sexual orientation,
national origin, or religious affiliation, in the bases that may not
be used to strike a juror.40 However, even these rules are greatly
criticized as being inadequate to fight racial discrimination.

The dissenting opinion to the Arizona Court of Appeal’s reasoning,
issued by Judge McMurdie, discusses the problems that this high
level of deference causes.28 While recognizing that the trial court
has a unique role in deciding this question, it is nearly impossible
to determine if the trial court clearly erred because demeanorbased justifications are indiscernible in a transcript, even if express
findings on the validity of the demeanor based justifications are
given.29 McCurdie further contends that requiring the trial courts
to make such express findings would not ensure that Batson
is “meaningfully enforced,” and believes the majority’s finding
is a result of their belief that Batson has been unable to end
discrimination in juries from its creation.30
Batson’s inability to protect juries from racial bias has been stated
beginning as early as Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson.31
There, Justice Marshall stated that Batson is only a first step
towards ending racial discrimination in jury selection, as it only
enables defendants to challenge blatant examples of racism.32
Justice Marshall also contended that Batson fails to protect against
a conscious or unconscious racism that could be possessed by a
prosecutor or judge.33
State v. Porter continues the nationwide tradition of puzzling
Batson jurisprudence. While stating that the Arizona Batson
jurisprudence does not require trial courts to make explicit
determinations at each step of Batson, the Court refuses to change
this, citing that, “Arizona precedent allows courts to defer to an
implicit finding that a reason was nondiscriminatory even when
the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor.”34
The Court ignores its ability to create its own rules to Batson
jurisprudence. And, its preference for deference is illustrated by its
continuous reference to the shared belief that “[demeanor] cannot
be shown from a cold transcript.”35 This case demonstrates how
broad the scope is for a peremptory challenge even under Snyder’s
limitations, and how easy it is to exercise a peremptory challenge
without running afoul of Batson.

Some scholars argue that rules like AB 3070 and GR 37 will not
succeed without training in implicit bias because these laws
don’t help lawyers more accurately identify real, evidence-based
concerns for juror bias on their own, which could lead to doubt or
fear in utilizing a Batson challenge.41 Scholars also criticize these
laws for failing to include an individual’s socioeconomic status
as a presumptively invalid reason in a peremptory strike, as
socioeconomic status has been supported by research to be closely
connected to race and ethnicity.42 Finally, these rules still do not
identify an appellate standard of review for erroneous applications
by trial judges.43 Other scholars, however, argue that retaining the
peremptory strikes with some reform is better than eliminating
the peremptory strike altogether, as eliminating the peremptory
strike “would likely result in an expansion of for-cause challenge
jurisprudence, including appellate review of for-cause challenges” as
jurors and judges hold racial biases, and there would still be debate
about race and jury selection.44
While these rules make it more difficult to use a peremptory
challenge based on race, this legislation is inadequate in preventing
discrimination in jury selection. Even though AB 3070 and GR 37
would have protected the minority defendant in Porter,45 they do
not prevent a lawyer from consciously or unconsciously developing
a “cheat sheet” of justifications that would be sufficient in the case
of a Batson challenge.46 Furthermore, neither rule prevents an
attorney from asking about these relationships, and an unconscious
bias paired with a conscious awareness of these rules may allow a
lawyer to use a peremptory strike for a proffered valid reason.
In their dissent, Judge McCurdie and Judge Swann raised additional
compelling arguments for the abolition of peremptory strikes.47 They
argued that it is constitutionally required that juries be selected
“from ‘a representative cross section of the community [which] is an
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,’”
and cited studies demonstrating that this is still not the case after
Batson.48 They further urged that the abolition of peremptory strikes
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was necessary to achieve a representative
cross section of the community.49
Thankfully, the Supreme Court of Arizona
accepted these arguments in the petition,
and became the first state to eliminate
peremptory challenges. Beginning January
1, 2022, prospective jurors may only be
excused for cause.50 All eyes are on Arizona
to see whether this legal experiment “will
create a fairer jury selection process or if it
will create other problems.”51
1.	Voir dire refers to the process of questioning
prospective jurors about their backgrounds
and potential biases. See, e.g., Cathy E.
Bennett ET AL., How to Conduct a Meaningful
& (and) Effective Voir Dire in Criminal Cases,
46 SMU L. Rev. 659, 660 (2016).
2.	See ELISABETH SEMEL ET AL.,
WHITEWASHING THE JURY BOX (Berkeley Law
Death Penalty Clinic ed., 2020) (“Empirical
evidence overwhelmingly shows that implicit
biases play a significant role in prosecutors’
peremptory challenges. Strikes based on
these biases most often adversely affect
Black defendants and Black Jurors”).
3.	See Shamena Anwar ET AL., The Impact of
Jury Race in Criminal Trials, The Q. J. of Econ.,
May 2012, at 1017.
4.	A peremptory challenge allows counsel to
eliminate prospective jurors without providing
explanation. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1136
(6th ed. 1990).
5.	Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 139, 1986
U.S. LEXIS 150, at *110-112 (1986) (“The
Court today holds that the State may not
use its peremptory challenges to strike black
prospective jurors on this basis without
violating the Constitution”).
6.	State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1279 Ariz.
App. LEXIS 362, at *2 (The prosecutor struck
this juror “because that juror’s ‘brother was
convicted of a crime that is of the same
nature as this matter, aggravated assault,’
and ‘[s]he did not seem to be very sure with
her responses to the State whether how [sic]
that impacted her or not.’”).
7.	See State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1279 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2020) (“the prosecutor explained that
she struck that juror because she ‘had been
on a criminal jury in the past which had found
an individual not guilty’ and ‘had also been
the foreperson of that jury’”).
8.	See State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1279. (The
jury acquitted Porter of aggravated assault
and convicted her of resisting arrest.)
9.	Juries are required to be selected from
“a representative cross section of the
community [which] is an essential component
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).

10.	The defendant appealed the trial court’s
finding regarding the Batson challenges
and argued that the prosecutor’s disparate
treatment of jurors and failure to conduct voir
dire on the topic of prior jury service revealed
the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent in
jury selection. The appellate court ruled in
favor of the defendant. The State of Arizona
then appealed the case before the Arizona
Supreme Court. See State v. Porter, 491 P.3d
1100, 1104, 2021 Ariz. LEXIS 243, at *3 (Ariz.
2021).
11.	This test is analogous to the McDonnell
Douglas test used in the employment
discrimination context. See Christopher
L. Ekman, Batson Challenges in State and
Federal Courts in Alabama: A Refresher and
Recent Decisions, 72 Ala. Law. 46, 48 (2011).
12.	Batson v. Kentucky, 475 U.S. 79, 97, 1986 U.S.
LEXIS 150, at *110-112 (1986).
13.	Id.
14.	Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 2008
U.S. LEXIS 2708, at *9 (2008).
15.	State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 496, 2006 La.
LEXIS 2309, at *35 (La. 2006) (“[N]ervousness
cannot be shown from a cold transcript,
which is why only the trial judge can evaluate
the demeanor of the juror and why the
judge’s evaluation must be given much
deference”).
16.	See Batson v. Kentucky, 475 U.S. 79, 96.
17.	See Batson v. Kentucky, 475 U.S. 79, 93.
18.	Id.
19.	Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475-476,
2008 U.S. LEXIS 2708, at *8 (2008).
20.	See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478.
21.	See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479
(“Rather than making a specific finding on
the record concerning Mr. Brooks’ demeanor,
the trial judge simply allowed the challenge
without explanation”).
22.	See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 487.
23.	Id.
24.	See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 482487.
25.	See State v. Porter, 491 P.3d 1100, 11081109.
26.	See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477.
27.	Id.
28.	State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1278, 2020
Ariz. App. LEXIS 362, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020)
(McCurdie, P., dissenting).
29.	See State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1278.
30.	See State v. Porter, 460 P. 3d 1276, 1289.
31.	Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-109,
1986 U.S. LEXIS 150, *46-58 (1986).
32.	Id.
33.	See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106.

18 x Case Western Reserve University School of Law x Social Justice Law Center

34.	State v. Porter, 491 P.3d 1100, 1107, 2021
Ariz. LEXIS 243, at *3 (Ariz. 2021) (citing State
v. Smith, 475 P.3d 558, 577, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS
308, *32 (Ariz. 2020)).
35.	State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 496, 2006 La.
LEXIS 2309, at *35 (La. 2006).
36.	Wash. General Rule 37 (effective 2018).
37.	Id.
38.	Id.
39.	Jim Frederick & Kate M. Wittlake, New Jury
Selection Procedure in California: Is this the
End of Peremptory Challenges? Is this the
End of Batson?, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/art
icle/new-jury-selection-procedure-californiaend-peremptory-challenges-end-batson.
40.	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 237.1 (West 2021).
41.	Brooks Holland, Article, Confronting the Bias
Dichotomy in Jury Selection, 81 La. L. Rev.
165, 213-216 (2020).
42.	Simon, supra note 44.
43.	Holland, supra note 45, at 212.
44.	Annie Sloan, “What to do About Batson?”:
Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit Bias in
Jury Selection, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 233, 263-265
(2020).
45.	Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 237.1 (West
2021) and Wash. General Rule 37 (effective
2018).
46.	See Ian A. Mance, Article, Cheat Sheets
and Capital Juries: In State v. Tucker, North
Carolina’s Attorney General and Supreme
Court Contend with Evidence of Prosecutors’
Efforts to Circumvent Batson v. Kentucky, 44
Campbell L. Rev. 3 (2021) (discusses a case
involving North Carolina prosecutors’ use
of a list, or “cheat sheet,” of justifications to
recite to a judge that may overcome a Batson
challenge).
47.	Hon. Peter B. Swann & Hon. Paul J. McMurdie,
Petition to Amend Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule
47(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,
(June 1, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/
Rules-Forum/aft/1208.
48.	Id.
49.	Id.
50.	Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 47(e)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R-21-0020
(2021).
51.	Cheryl Corley, Arizona’s Supreme Court
Eliminates Peremptory Challenges,
NPR (Sept. 6, 2021), https ://www.npr.
org/2021/09/06/1034556234/arizonassupreme-court-eliminates-peremptorychallenges.

